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23 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

VIA : Chief, COMPS

SUBJECT : Coordination of IX-312

1. The difficulties encountered in the production of IX-312 (Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist Intentions and Capabilities with Respect to Taiwan), while not new in nature, were so noteworthy that it is considered advisable to bring them to the attention of the DCI for his information. If this production should be considered as a fair example, it would appear that five working days is the minimum production time from inception to final publication as a "coordinated" national intelligence estimate. This time requirement is certainly unacceptable in the world situation as it is today, and this consideration becomes all the more important when viewed in the light of recent argumentation to place additional emphasis on the "coordination" process for the production of National Intelligence.

2. Among the problems encountered in the preparation and coordination of this study were the following:

a. Indifferent working-level support afforded CIA by the military agencies.

b. Challenge of the CIA estimate in the coordination conference for not taking into consideration the capabilities of the US forces deployed in the area although information concerning these capabilities had been refused to CIA. The terms of reference, although restricted in this way, were, nevertheless, acceptable to the representative of the requester (State) but were initially opposed by the military agencies. Omission of US capabilities was subsequently accepted by the representatives of the military agencies at the conference after the title of the paper had been changed and a specific note concerning the mission inserted. In spite of this, however, the dissents of the military agencies were based largely on the fact that the effect of US intervention was not considered in the paper.

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c. Repudiation by the heads of the three military agencies of the concurrence their representatives expressed at a formal coordination meeting in which the estimate was extensively modified to meet their objections. In addition, the dissent of the Air Force was not in proper form and, therefore, unacceptable. First agency action was not completed by the military agencies by the deadline set, although Navy's dissent was received in time for publication.

These problems are elaborated in detail in TAB A.

3. The basic issue presented by this case, apart from purely procedural or mechanical aspects of coordination, is the proper location of intelligence responsibility for the kind of estimate originally desired by the requesters; namely, one including an evaluation of US capabilities in a situation where US forces were already deployed. The possibility that this kind of problem may be presented more frequently in the future indicates a need for an early resolution of this question.

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Reports and Estimates

Attachment
TAB "A"

OAD/OEE:fd (fr D/Pub raft)
Distribution:

Orig to addressee
COAPS
S/PP
D/FE
AD/OEE

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TAB "A"

1. Lack of Working-Level Cooperation.

The following is quoted from a report of the Far East Division of ONS which was responsible for the preparation of the initial draft:

"...The military agencies...did something less than what reasonably could be expected of them. The project was assigned to D/PK at about 0930 hours on Monday, 24 July. Terms of reference were under discussion with the requester until nearly noon. D/PK delivered to the IAC agencies prior to 1600 hours a substantive outline on which were indicated the items of information that each agency was requested to present at a preliminary IAC working-level meeting on the following afternoon, Tuesday, 25 July. In the meantime, D/PK produced a preliminary draft for use at this meeting. It became apparent in the 25 July meeting that none of the IAC conferees had prepared any of the material requested and that none was qualified to discuss D/PK's preliminary draft except in the most general terms. It was therefore necessary to set up a second meeting for 0930 hours the following morning, Wednesday, 26 July. In order to reduce the burden on the IAC conferees, the meeting was held in the Pentagon rather than at CIA. This conference involved nearly four hours of discussion. Army and Air Force conferees again were not completely prepared with the data requested. Meanwhile, D/PK had had to meet its first deadline (to SS/ONS) with a tentative draft in which all quantitative military data were subject to revision. The validity of some of the data provided by the IAC (notably Air Force data) was questioned by the CIA representatives but at IAC insistence the figures were accepted for the second IN draft. Subsequently, at the IAC meeting on Thursday, 27 July, held for the purpose of formal coordination, the very figures which had been questioned by CIA on Wednesday were challenged by the military IAC representatives. This indifferent IAC support of an urgent national intelligence estimate was probably not deliberate but rather arose from preoccupation with departmental deadlines. It is notable that the military agencies prepared a draft joint estimate between 25 and 27 July and drew heavily on the original D/PK draft, dodging or changing the treatment of certain important considerations, however. In short, the essential spirit of actual cooperation was lacking."

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2. Challenge of the Terms of Reference of the Estimate.

The original requirement from the Department of State included a request for an estimate of the power of the US 7th Fleet to repel a Communist attack. Because of the operational character of this information, this point was initially omitted from the terms of reference and the State representative was advised. The Assistant Director, ONS, however, took steps to obtain the information but it was not made available to him. The paper, therefore, was limited to Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist intentions and capabilities and consideration of the probable developments if some Chinese Communist forces should succeed in landing on Taiwan.

At the coordination meeting immediate objections were raised by the Army representative because the estimate did not include consideration of the capabilities of US forces committed to the defense of Taiwan. It appeared that the military agencies were generally inclined to consider the paper unrealistic in this respect. The Army representative also appeared to question the propriety of an estimate of the probable outcome of an operation where US forces were already committed. However, after changing the title to indicate that only Communist and Nationalist capabilities were being considered, and including a note specifically excluding consideration of US forces, the conference proceeded with coordination of the paper and ultimately agreed to it as revised.

On the following day, however, the Navy submitted a dissent based on the fact that the estimate did not consider the effect of the employment of US forces on Chinese Communist intentions. A telephoned concurrence from the Army was received in the morning but cancelled later in the day by General Irwin. This was followed by a written dissent a week later based also on the failure to include the effect of US intervention in Taiwan. The Air Force dissent, which was not received in acceptable form in time for publication, also took into consideration the effect of US intervention. It should be noted that, although the paper did not estimate US capabilities, it did consider the effect of the US pronouncement of 27 June on Communist intentions.

3. Repudiation of Concurrences of Conference by the Heads of the Military Agencies.

At the conclusion of the coordination meeting on Thursday, 27 July, all four agencies indicated their agreement with the paper as modified. The deadline for formal concurrence or dissent had been fixed

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at 1000 the following day. Agency action was to be reported by telephone, to be followed immediately by written confirmation. The deadline to the requester was 1700. The State Department telephoned its concurrence at 0927 and followed it promptly with written confirmation. The Army telephoned concurrence at 0950, but this was cancelled by General Irwin later in the day. A written dissent was dispatched by Army on 4 August.

At 0956 the Air Force called to request a change in the conclusions which CIA could not accept. The issue was one which had been extensively discussed and disposed of at the coordination meeting. At about 1020 the Air Force indicated that a dissent would be forthcoming by 1300. They were unable to meet this deadline and requested an extension — which was granted — to 1500. A representative from the Air Force arrived at 1510 with a dissent but, in the meantime, his office had called requesting changes in the dissent. Much time was consumed by the Air Force representative in revising the dissent. The Assistant Director, ORR, intervened at this time and advised the Air Force that the dissent was unacceptable. This was reported in detail by the AD/ORR in a memorandum dated 28 July 1950 to the DCI, and supplemented in a memorandum dated 2 August 1950.

The Navy reported at about 1045 that they were still undecided but were inclined to concur with comment if the comment would be published. Navy was advised that the comments would not be published, and at 1250 they advised CIA that a dissent would be submitted. This was received in time for inclusion in the paper.

As reported in detail by the AD/ORR in his memorandum of 28 July, two copies of this paper were dispatched to Mr. Armstrong in the State Department with a notation of the non-receipt of Army and Air Comments in time for inclusion.

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